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Playing Games: 
The Two Koreas and the Beijing Olympics 
 
Brian Bridges1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Inter-Korean sporting contacts in and around the Olympics over the 
past 60 years suggest that there is a close relationship between 
politics and sports. For divided nations such as the two Koreas, 
which by their very rationale are involved in a highly-charged 
competition for legitimacy with their other ‘part-nation’, the 
Olympics have been a particularly potent arena for political 
posturing and manoeuvring. This paper examines the troubled 
history of the two Koreas’ endeavours to enter the Olympic 
movement and then out-do each other; the fruitless efforts to agree 
on a joint Olympic team (from early negotiations in Hong Kong in 
1963 through to the present day); and the potential Chinese role in 
the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, which means so much to 
China. 
 
 
The Olympic Games, to be held in Beijing in August 2008, are 
already much in everyone’s minds. As nations from around the 
world prepare, select and finally send their athletes to Beijing, one 
focus of attention will be the representation from China’s 
neighbours, the two Koreas. With the support and encouragement of 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the two Koreas’ 
                                                 
1 Brian Bridges is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and 
Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University. This is a revised 
version of a paper presented at the  International Conference on ‘China and Korea: A 
New Nexus in East Asia?’ hosted by Lingnan University’s Institute of Humanities and 
Social Sciences, 30-31 May 2007. 
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National Olympic Committees (NOCs) have already raised the 
possibility of fielding a joint team for the first time ever at an 
Olympics Games. However, despite several rounds of discussions 
both bilaterally and with IOC involvement, at the time of writing 
there is still no definitive agreement on this joint team. This paper, 
therefore, aims to examine the prospects for the creation of a joint 
team against the background of six decades of sporting and political 
competition and cooperation between the Republic of Korea 
(hereafter South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (hereafter North Korea).  
 
Despite the ideal that ‘sport has nothing to do with politics’ – which 
was a central tenet of the founding father and other early leaders of 
the Olympic movement -  scholars and observers have frequently 
commented on the deep linkages between sport and politics. 
Therefore, it would be naïve to expect the Olympic Games, the 
premier international sporting event, to be free of such political 
influences. As one senior IOC official has recorded, ‘in practice, it is 
evident that sport and politics do indeed mix, at many different 
levels’.2 Moreover, sport can be used both internally and externally, 
for in the words of Richard Espy, ‘sport can provide a malleable 
foreign policy tool indicating various shades of political significance 
depending on the intent, and perceived intent, of the parties 
concerned’.3 As such, in a world still characterised by international 
tensions between ideologies and states, it is not surprising for 
‘participant units in transnational institutions like the Olympic 
Games to behave as if these are, to paraphrase Clausewitz, an 
extension of politics by other means’.4  
 
                                                 
2  Richard Pound, Five Rings Over Korea: The Secret Negotiations Behind the 1988 
Olympic Games in Seoul. (New York: Little Brown & Co, 1994),p. 50 
3  Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), p. 4. 
4 J. Hargreaves, ‘Olympism and Nationalism: Some preliminary considerations’, in 
Eric Dunning and Dominic Malcolm (eds). Sport: Critical Concepts in Sociology. 
Volume IV, Issues in the Sociology of Sport. (London: Routledge, 2003), p.21. 
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For divided nations, which by their very rationale are involved in a 
highly-charged competition for legitimacy with their other ‘part-
nation’, the Olympics inevitably became such an arena for political 
posturing and manoeuvring.  
 
Two Koreas and the Olympics 
 
Since their formal foundation in 1948 the North and South Korean 
states had been involved in a highly competitive struggle, which had 
found expression not just through the military clashes of the Korean 
War but also through diplomatic, economic and cultural means in the 
subsequent years. Both governments initially adopted a ‘one Korea’ 
policy, which in the Cold War environment meant that the South 
was recognised and supported by the United States and the West 
Europeans, while the North was similarly endorsed by the Soviet 
Union, China and the East Europeans. Neither Korea was admitted 
to the United Nations, but both worked hard to achieve support and 
recognition amongst the emerging ‘Third World’ countries. Sport 
was no exception to this struggle for advantage, prestige and 
legitimacy.  
 
Modern, or rather Western, sports had only been introduced into 
Korea in the late nineteenth century, but these were actually seen by 
some Korean modernizers as a useful means of promoting national 
solidarity. The later Japanese colonisers also introduced some sports 
such as judo and table-tennis as part of their attempt to ‘Japanize’ 
Korean society.5 After liberation from Japanese rule, the Koreans on 
both sides of the border sought international sporting recognition 
just as avidly as they campaigned for diplomatic recognition.  
 
                                                 
5  For sport in Korea under the Japanese rule, see Gwang Oh, ‘The Political 
Significance of Sport: An Asian Case Study – Sport, Japanese Colonial Policy and 
Korean National Resistance, 1910-1945’, International Journal of the History of 
Sport, July 2005, pp. 649-670. 
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Ha Nam-Gil and J.A.Mangan have commented that post-1945 South 
Korean sport was ‘closely linked to political priorities, purposes and 
personnel’ and was ‘politically-driven, resourced and endorsed and it 
was the direct product of … .ideological purpose’.6  This assessment 
could equally validly be applied to North Korean priorities too. 
Sport represented a tangible means to showcase the proclaimed 
superiority of each political system in this intense bilateral rivalry 
for national and international legitimacy.  
 
The South Korean National Olympic Committee (NOC) quickly 
applied for IOC recognition and even sent athletes to the 1948 
London Olympics. As James Grayson comments, ‘this was clearly 
done for the purpose of promoting awareness of the existence of the 
Korean state’. 7  The North made repeated attempts to gain IOC 
recognition for its own NOC, but was rebuffed on the grounds that 
there could not be more than one recognised NOC in any one 
country. In the late 1950s, however, pressure began to build up from 
the Soviet Union and East European countries, which, drawing on 
the experience of the two Germanies, argued for recognition of the 
North Korean NOC and the creation of a unified team for future 
Olympics.  
 
In 1957 the IOC gave provisional recognition for a North Korean 
NOC, but only for ‘internal affairs’ not international events. At the 
IOC session in May 1959 the Soviet and Bulgarian members 
strongly argued for the full and separate recognition of the North 
Korean NOC, but IOC President Avery Brundage still preferred a 
joint Korean team on the German model for the 1960 Rome 
                                                 
6  Ha Nam-Gil and J.A.Mangan,, ‘Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport - 
Transformation, 1945-92’, in J.A.Mangan and Fan Hong, eds, Sport in Asian Society: 
Past and Present, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.214. 
7  James Grayson, ‘Sport in Korea: Tradition, Modernization and the Politics of a 
Newly Industrialized State’, in J. Binfield and J. Stevenson eds. Sport, Culture and 
Politics. (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), p.166.  
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Olympics.8 No progress was made, however, and the North Korean 
athletes were left out in the cold and did not participate in the Rome 
Olympics; only South Korean athletes took part. 
 
Consequently, not until the 1964 Tokyo Olympics did both South 
Korea and, for the first time ever in the summer Olympics, North 
Korea send athletes. Yet, the latter actually withdrew after its 
athletes had arrived in Japan, when some of them were disqualified, 
providing a last minute twist to what had been a series of 
complicated and contentious efforts over the previous three years to 
try to secure either at best a joint Korean team or at least the separate 
participation of both Koreas in the Tokyo Olympics.  
 
The Hong Kong role9 
 
In 1962 the North Korean NOC was given full IOC recognition 
along the same lines as East Germany, namely that a unified team 
should be formed as a result of joint competition.10  For the first time 
ever since the division of the Korean peninsula the two Koreas held 
sports talks, albeit under the auspices of the IOC, at Lausanne, 
Switzerland, in early 1963. The South Korean NOC then proposed a 
bilateral meeting just between the two Korean NOCs, with no formal 
IOC participation, to be held in ‘neutral’ Hong Kong. The first 
meeting - the first of their kind ever involving solely North and 
South Koreans – was held in May, but a second follow-up meeting, 
in July, broke down on the first day, as each side accused the other 
                                                 
8  Christopher Hill, Olympic Politics. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992). In the 1956, 1960 and 1964 Olympics, an all-German team competed, 
composed of athletes from both West and East Germany.  Wallace Irwin, Politics of 
International Sport: Games of Power, (New York: Foreign policy Association,  1988), 
p. 38.  South Vietnam participated in some post-1948 Olympics, before the Vietnam 
War became too intense, and the united Vietnam was admitted to the Olympic 
movement in 1979.  
9  The following section draws heavily on my article, ‘Reluctant Mediator: Hong 
Kong, the Two Koreas and the Tokyo Olympics’, International Journal of the History 
of Sport, Vol.24, No.3, March 2007, pp. 375-391. 
10 Hill, Olympic Politics, p.193. 
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of bad faith. After further frustrating interventions by the IOC it was 
decided that since the negotiations for a joint team were making no 
progress then there would be two Korean teams allowed to 
participate in Tokyo.11 
 
The inter-Korean meetings in Hong Kong in 1963 provided ample 
evidence that the intense bilateral competition between the two 
Koreas, backed by their respective supporters and superpowers, had 
already been projected into the Olympic movement. While South 
Korea had initially held the edge, in terms of being the first of the 
two countries to be formally admitted into the IOC, the North later 
found powerful voices amongst the Soviet and East European 
countries to argue its case. From the late 1950s onwards the Korean 
representation issue was to become as difficult for the IOC as the 
issues of the two Germanies and China-Taiwan.  
 
For both the South and North Korean governments the negotiations 
about forming a joint team for the Tokyo Olympics became 
significant components of their respective political and foreign 
policy aspirations. For both countries - a centrally-planned North 
and an authoritarian South - it was unrealistic to expect that their 
NOCs would be able to carry out policies which did not conform to 
these governmental objectives. At that period the intensity of the 
rivalry, barely a decade after the end of the internecine Korean War, 
was such that it was perhaps naïve of IOC officials to expect either 
side to make sufficient concessions for a compromise to be reached.  
 
                                                 
11  Olympic Review,1964, http://www.aafla.org/OlympicInformationCenter/Olympic 
Review/1963/BDCE85/BDCE85n.pdf . Six members of the North Korean athletic 
team were banned from participating, because they had taken part in the so-called 
‘anti- imperialist’ GANEFO Games (Games of the Newly Emerging Forces) in 
Indonesia the previous September. When the IOC insisted on the ban, North Korean 
officials withdrew their whole team and left Japan without competing.  
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Intensifying competition 
 
However, subsequently, despite intermittent discussions over the 
following decades, the two Koreas have never fielded a joint team at 
the Olympics. The North gained more from these failed talks in the 
early 1960s than did the South, since from the 1968 Olympics the 
North was able to compete on an equal footing with the South, but in 
the 1970s it was the South which was to become more adept 
diplomatically, waging a campaign which was to culminate in the 
1981 IOC decision to award the 1988 Olympic Games to Seoul.  
 
In fact, during the 1960s and 1970s the South Korean government of 
President Park Chung-hee used sports promotion as one of several 
means to create a national revival after the traumas of colonization 
and civil war. Labelled by some as the ‘father of modern sport’, Park 
introduced a number of innovative sports policies at both the elite 
and mass level and even the idea of winning the right to host the 
Olympics originated during his period in office.12  In North Korea 
too sporting activity became an important part of societal 
mobilization and development. Mass sports, involving usually 
gymnastics, became a regular feature of North Korean society. 
Nonetheless, both Koreas had been relatively low-key in terms of 
participating in international sporting events during the 1960s and 
1970s (apart from the notable example of the North Korean soccer 
team’s almost legendary exploits in the 1966 World Cup in 
England13).  
 
Periods of relative rapprochement between the two Koreas 
frequently led to some discussions on joint teams for sporting 
events, but as the political atmosphere soured again so too did the 
sporting talks splutter and fail. Even after the political breakthrough 
of the 1972 North-South Joint Declaration, efforts made to develop 
                                                 
12 Ha and Mangan, ‘Ideology, Politics,Power’, pp. 219-220, 225-231. 
13  Memorably recalled in the documentary film, ‘The Game of Their Lives’ [now 
available on DVD]. 
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greater sporting exchanges and even form joint teams failed. Sports 
organisations and facilities in the South had developed to the stage 
that it could host some international competitions, but, under 
pressure from the North, communist country athletes did not 
participate.14  Agreement failed to be reached for a joint team for the 
35th World Table Tennis Championships, held in Pyongyang in 1979 
(the first major international sporting event hosted by the North) and 
South Korean table tennis players were not admitted into 
Pyongyang. 15  This failed negotiation (and what was perceived 
internationally as North Korean intransigence) had two results: 
firstly, international sporting federations became wary of the North, 
which was not again asked to host a major international sporting 
event, and, secondly, during the 1980s, socialist allies of the North 
slowly became more willing to send their athletes to international 
sporting competitions in the South.16 
 
In the early 1980s, government-level meetings were held to discuss 
sending joint teams to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics and the 1986 
Asian Games in Seoul,17 although in the end North Korea boycotted 
both of these events (it should be noted that South Korea had 
boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics).  
 
It was the partial boycotts of the 1980 and 1984 Olympics and the 
IOC’s determination to secure a boycott-free Olympics in Seoul that 
made the 1988 Olympics a particular focus of political controversy. 
The North Koreans, with particularly vocal support from Cuba, 
criticised the choice of Seoul on safety grounds, but the IOC held 
firm and refused to change venue. Consequently, the North then 
                                                 
14 Ralph Clough, Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), pp.318-319. 
15 Ibid, pp.319-320. 
16 Ibid, p.320. 
17 Choi Dae-souk., ‘Building Bridges: The Significance of Inter-Korean Sports and 
Cultural Exchange’. East Asian Review, Winter 2002, pp.107-115.Pyongyang had 
also bid to host the 1986 Asian Games, but withdrew at the last moment when it 
seemed clear that Seoul would win selection.  
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asked for a co-hosting arrangement. Both the South and the IOC 
rejected this proposal (not least because the Olympics are awarded to 
only one city), but the IOC at the same time showed some 
willingness to discuss the possibilities of some events being held in 
the North. There then followed during 1985-88 a series of 
convoluted discussions, which are described in impressive detail in 
Richard Pound’s insider account. 18 At one stage the two Korean 
NOCs and the IOC did come close to agreement over some 
preliminary rounds of sports being held in the North, but the offers 
were never sufficient to satisfy the North and, despite IOC 
willingness to keep the door open until the very last minute, North 
Korean athletes did not participate in the Seoul Olympics. However, 
with the exception of Cuba, the various socialist allies of the North 
all sent athletes to Seoul and in the process helped to lay one of the 
foundations for what would become their diplomatic recognitions of 
the South during the course of the following four years.  
 
The road to Beijing 
 
The dream of a joint Korean sporting team continued to remain just 
that, a dream. In fact, only twice, in the same year of 1991 at the 
World Table Tennis Championships held in Japan and the Junior 
World Football Championships in Portugal has a joint Korean team 
been fielded in a major international sporting event.19 Incidentally, 
this achievement came at a time of renewed North-South political 
dialogue, at the prime ministerial level, but also seems to have a 
Chinese dimension, since joint cheering of each others’ athletes by 
South and North Korean supporters attending the Beijing Asian 
Games in 1990 was an important impetus. Nevertheless, the joint 
teams were the result of ‘government contacts rather than purely 
                                                 
18 Pound, Five Rings Over Korea. See also Park Seh-jik, The Seoul Olympics: The 
Inside Story (London: Bellew Publishing, 1991).  
19 Choi, ‘Building Bridges’, p.109. 
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civilian exchanges’.20 In fact, the 1990s did not see any successful 
follow-up in terms of joint participation in Olympics nor indeed 
much in the way of inter-Korean sporting exchanges at all.21 It is 
against this background that we must consider the more recent 
Olympics.  
 
The historic June 2000 summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Jong Il, in Pyongyang, undoubtedly opened the way for greater 
cooperation and collaboration in North-South Korean relations. 
Consequently, at the 2000 Sydney Olympics the two Koreas entered 
the Olympic stadiums under a joint flag (the so-called ‘unification 
flag’, consisting of a blue outline of the undivided Korean peninsula 
on a white background) and wearing identical uniforms at the 
opening ceremonies. It was an emotional moment for the Koreans 
and for the watching crowd. Nonetheless, the athletes competed in 
the various sport events as two separate national teams.  
 
Subsequently, the North Koreans participated in the September 2002 
Asian Games in Busan, the first ever such occasion for North 
Korean athletes to participate in an international sporting event in 
the South. That success seems in part to be due to the South’s 
strategy of avoiding the complicated questions of a joint team and 
instead focusing on joint parade at the opening and the separate 
participation of North Korean athletes in sports. 22 The attractive 
female North Korean cheer-leading troupe seems to have gone down 
particularly well with the South Korean media and public.23 
                                                 
20 Gabriel Jonnson, Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and 
Cooperation. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 119-120. 
21 Byun Jin-Heung has argued that effectively there was an eight-year break in inter-
Korean sports exchanges in the 1990s. Byun Jin-Heung. ‘Inter-Korean Exchanges and 
Peace on the Korean Peninsula’, in Peace on the Korean Peninsula through Sports 
Exchange. (Seoul: Sports Institute for National Unification, 2003), pp.131-132.  
22 Choi, ‘Building Bridges’, p.112. 
23 A later, unsubstantiated, report said that 21 out of the 270 cheerleaders had been 
sent to a labour camp for apparently talking too publicly about the advanced level of 
development they had found in Busan. South China Morning Post [hereafter SCMP], 
29 November 2006. See also Jonsson, Towards Korean Reconciliation, pp.120-121. 
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The newly-established ‘tradition’ of a joint team entry was carried 
on to the 2003 Asian Winter Games in Aomori and the 2004 Athens 
Olympics Games. Although international tensions had been raised 
because of the crisis over the North’s suspected nuclear-weapon 
development programme, from October 2002, both sides were 
willing to continue to come together for these sporting events. For 
both countries, however, a desire to pass a political message to the 
United States may have contributed to this cooperation. The North 
certainly would have wanted to show the United States, so ‘hard 
line’ in the North’s view, that it could coordinate with the South, 24 
while the South may also have wished to distance itself from the 
worsening political atmosphere in US-North Korean relations. 
 
This, in turn, led to the revival of ideas to form a joint team for the 
2006 Asian Games in Doha and the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
Representatives of the two Korean NOCs met in Guangzhou in 
September 2005 (where they agreed in principle on a unified team), 
in Macau in November 2005, and in December 2005 when they 
began a series of bilateral meetings in Kaesong, on the North-South 
Korean border. As had been the case in earlier talks, the IOC has 
been actively encouraging bilateral talks and occasionally hosting 
trilateral talks. In June 2006 IOC President Jacques Rogge wrote to 
both Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun urging 
them to cooperate in forming a unified team. The missile tests by the 
North brought a halt to exchanges, but Rogge later, in September, 
hosted the heads of the two NOCs at a meeting in Lausanne and 
included an offer to increase the number of athletic spots open to 
Koreans if there were to be a unified team.25 Once again, after the 
October nuclear test by the North and the absence of any last mi nute 
                                                 
24 Song Young-Dae, ‘The Political Situation on the Korean peninsula and the 2010 
Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games’, in Peace on the Korean Peninsula  through 
Sports Exchange. (Seoul: Sports Institute for National Unification, 2003), p.30. 
25  Agence France Presse, 23 June 2006, and Yonhap News Agency, 7 September 
2006, both in LexisNexis database. 
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agreement over a joint team, the two Koreas’ athletes marched in 
together at the opening ceremony but competed separately at the 
Doha Asian Games. Nonetheless, at this time North Korea did 
openly convey to the IOC its support for South Korea’s 
Pyeongchang’s bid to host the 2014 Winter Olympics.26 
 
This year, the latest round of formal inter-Korean talks on a joint 
Olympic team took place in Kaesong in February, with more 
informal contacts in Kuwait in April and in Hong Kong in June 
2007, but still no solution has been achieved. There is a considerable 
degree of agreement, on issues such as the flag (the much-used 
unification flag), the national anthem to be played when medal 
winners are on the podium (the 1920s version of the traditional 
Korean folk song ‘Arirang’), and the uniforms (following earlier 
designs but all supplied by the South). One key area remains 
outstanding – and it is an issue that has remained since those early 
days back in Hong Kong in 1963 – how to choose the athletes to 
compete.  
 
For individual sports, the accepted manner is for individual athletes 
to achieve qualification for the Olympics by reaching the necessary 
standards set by the IOC. The problems come with team sports. The 
disagreement basically boils down to the selection of team members. 
The South argues that the athletes should be chosen on merit (simply 
the best players from each side), while the North argues that they 
should be chosen in equal numbers, to reflect the truly unified and 
egalitarian nature of the team. For the South, one unified team 
should be stronger than two divided ones, particularly in certain 
                                                 
26 The President of the North Korean NOC sent a letter to Rogge in December 2005 
arguing that a Pyeonchang Olympics would enhance reconciliation and cooperation 
between the two Koreas. Korea Times, 22 December 2006. In July 2007  Pyeonchang 
lost the decision to Sochi, Russia. Another conciliatory gesture from the North 
resulted in preliminary talks in April 2007 about the two taekwondo associations, the 
International Taekwondo Federation, backed by the North, and the World Taekwondo 
Federation, backed by the South, beginning discussions about merging. Significantly, 
it is the WTF which will be training and supplying referees to the Beijing Olympics.  
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team sport events.27 For the North, it is a matter of pride that its 
athletes should be seen as inferior to the South’s and should be 
treated equally. Clearly in some team sports the South is stronger, 
such as men’s soccer and handball, while in others the North has a 
stronger international reputation, such as women’s soccer. Even if 
the basic principle of selection is agreed, then there still remains the 
issue of the mechanism for selecting the players through training or 
practice matches or some other format. 
 
What role can the IOC and China, whether the government or the 
Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) 
play?  At the moment, the IOC is encouraging from the sidelines, 
rather like its role in 1963, but not getting as actively involved as it 
did in the pre-1988 talks. In addition, to induce some degree of 
urgency, it has pointed out to both Koreas that the team qualifying 
competitions are about to begin or already have begun. Maybe soon 
it will be too late to change already settled finalists.   
 
China clearly has committed significant resources and prestige into 
hosting a successful Olympics. As such, in the Korean context, 
China would like to have at the very least the repetition of the joint 
entry parade at the opening and closing ceremonies. It is also playing 
already an additional role by announcing that the Olympic torch 
route will pass from Seoul to Pyongyang next summer. But, in 
parallel with its role in pushing forward a solution to the nuclear 
issue through hosting the six-party talks and cajoling the participants 
towards a solution (the February 2007 agreement, for example) in 
that aspect, China is probably looking for something more in the 
sports field too. In other words, the joint entry plus alpha. A real 
joint team for the first time in Olympic history would at the very 
least bring reflected glory to China. China has so far remained 
largely on the sidelines, as the two Koreas deal with the IOC, but 
                                                 
27 One South Korean NOC official argued that ‘we would be come stronger in team 
sports, and not so much in the individual sports’. SCMP, 1 November 2005.  
 14 
some informal pressure, especially on the North Koreans, may be 
expected in the coming months.  
 
However, even if the joint team concept is unrealisable, then China 
may yet try to gain some other diplomatic and political benefits from 
the Korean participation. Even though a North-South summit 
meeting between Roh and Kim is planned for October 2007 (after 
being postponed from late August due to flooding in the North), next 
year’s Olympics in Beijing could provide another opportunity to 
bring the two leaders together. Invitations to the two Korean leaders, 
Roh’s successor (who takes office in February 2008) and Kim, to 
attend the opening ceremony might enable an unprecedented three-
party summit to take place in Beijing under Hu Jintao’s auspices.28 
 
The way forward 
 
Clearly this brief overview above of inter-Korean sporting contacts 
in and around the Olympics over the past 60 years suggests that 
there is indeed a close relationship between politics and sports. 
 
For some observers and participants, sporting contacts are a way to 
overcome or at least ameliorate political difficulties and differences. 
Certainly, at the general level, sports can contribute to improving 
international relations. The successes of the ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ 
which helped to stimulate China-United States diplomatic contacts 
in the early 1970s, the more recent ‘cricket diplomacy’ between 
Indian and Pakistani leaders, and, arguably, the Korea-Japan World 
Cup soccer finals co-hosting are well-known examples.  
 
                                                 
28 The 2000 North-South Korean Summit agreed that Kim Jong Il would visit Seoul at 
an appropriate time, but so far he has not gone south. Even though the North-South 
railway has successfully concluded an initial test run, it seems unlikely that he will 
visit Seoul in the near future.  Some criticism within South Korea has been levelled at 
the fact that Roh would become the second president to go north, with no reciprocal 
visit south by Kim. A ‘neutral’ venue in a third country may be necessary for any 
incoming South Korean president to justify another summit.  
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But, it has been argued, sports can have a more specific impact on 
inter-Korean relations. Park Sung-il, a South Korean NOC official, 
has argued: ‘We are all brothers, one mind, one soul. And we are 
confident that through sports we can bring the two Koreas 
together’.29 A China Daily editorial writer has also argued that a 
joint Korean team for the Beijing Olympics ‘is expected too help 
achieve new breakthroughs in inter-Korean relations. The 
significance of such a partnership will go far beyond sports’.30 The 
basic argument here is that socio-cultural exchanges, of which sport 
is a key example, can contribute to consolidating the development of 
co-existence on the Korean peninsula and, ultimately, to unifying the 
nation.31 
 
For others, however, it is politics that drive, distort or obstruct 
sporting exchanges. A German sports academic, Manfred Lammer, 
in analysing the reasons why an all-German sports team was 
possible in the late 1950s-early 1960s, has argued that it ‘owed its 
existence not to the autonomy of sport, but to the room for 
manoeuvre provided by politics’, because political and economic 
contacts between the two Germanies were already ‘intensive and 
more flexible than for instance in Korea’. 32   Byun Jin-Heung, 
describing specifically the Korean situation, has argued that 
‘although the basic principle requires that inter-Korean sports 
exchange should be freed from the shadows of political 
manipulations, it has not been able to pull it off’. 33  From this 
perspective, for socio-cultural contacts to be effective in inducing 
change at least need some basic convergence in political and 
economic standpoints is necessary.  
                                                 
29 SCMP, 1 November 2005. 
30 China Daily, 27 February 2004. 
31 See Jonssson, Towards Korean Reconciliation, pp. 232-234. 
32  Manfred Lammer, ‘The Olympic Games: A Bridge to Unification? German 
Experience and Korean Perspectives ’, in Peace on the Korean Peninsula  through 
Sports Exchange. (Seoul: Sports Institute for National Unification, 2003), pp. 109-
110. 
33 Byun, ‘Inter-Korean Exchanges’, p. 133.  
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At the very least, in divided societies and countries, where 
nationalism and political legitimacy become closely inter-twined, it 
seems that sporting contacts and cooperation are much more likely 
to be at the mercy of political events and under-currents. In the 
Korean case, therefore, the nature, pace and intensity of inter-Korean 
sports exchanges have been dictated by political and diplomatic 
circumstances.  
 
Koreans both north and south of the border have an undoubted 
enthusiasm for sport,34 but inter-Korean sporting exchanges have not 
had a stable and consistent foundation. The ‘special’ sporting events 
have too much of a one-off feel to them and do not lead to regular 
sporting exchanges. There are few, if any, opportunities for 
‘ordinary’ Koreans to carry out sporting interactions.  
 
On 27 February 1963 then IOC President Brundage wrote to the 
President of the North Korean NOC that the initial agreement to 
form a united Korean team for the next Olympics was ‘a great 
victory for sport’.35 His optimism was to prove premature back then. 
Can his dream be realised 45 years later? 
 
Now that the joint entry into international sporting events has the 
marks of becoming a standard or even ‘routine’ procedure, perhaps 
there is some scope for moving on to other forms of inter-Korean 
sporting cooperation. However, while the diplomatic and political 
relationship between North and South remains ‘abnormal’, the 
prospects for ‘normal’ sporting exchanges remain cloudy. In this 
context, it remains likely too that once again, in Beijing, there will 
not be a unified Korean team competing in the Olympics. 
                                                 
34  See James Hoare and Susan Pares, North Korea in the 21st Century: An 
Interpretative  Guide. (Folkestone: Global Oriental 2005), pp. 87-88 for comments on 
sports in the North today.  
35 Olympic Studies Centre archives: Avery Brundage Collection, microfilm of papers 
from Box 138. 
